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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CORPORATE BLOCKHOLDERS AND LEVERAGE 
Thuy D. Bui 
University of Pittsburgh, 2017 
 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between corporate block ownership and firm leverage. 
Corporate blockholders – nonfinancial firms who hold more than five percent equity in another 
industrial corporation − can affect a firm’s policies through their business relationships, 
monitoring, or through expropriation. By examining the evolution of corporate block ownership 
after block formation, I find that corporate block ownership is negatively related to firm leverage 
in fixed-effects and dynamic GMM regressions. In addition, corporate blockholders often obtain 
board seats, indicating that corporate investors are actively involved in governance activities. 
Furthermore, the negative relationship between corporate blocks and leverage becomes stronger 
when corporate blockholders have more board representation on the target firm, when the firm has 
higher agency costs, and when there is no product market relationship between corporate 
blockholders and the firm. Overall, my findings suggest that corporate blockholders play an 
important monitoring role in firm policies and can substitute for other monitoring mechanisms 
including leverage and institutional investors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A large proportion of prior literature on capital structure has focused on the relationship between 
leverage and different firm characteristics such as market-to-book, profitability, tangibility, and 
firm size as summarized in Frank and Goyal (2009). A separate strand of the literature looks at the 
relationship between various aspects of ownership structure and leverage. Early on, researchers 
such as Friend and Lang (1988), Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) have looked at managerial 
ownership and its effect on ownership structure. More recent papers have started to look at the 
effect of block ownership on capital structure such as family ownership (Ellul, 2009; Chen, 
Dasgupta and Yu, 2014), and institutional ownership (Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent, 2017). 
However, the empirical evidence is mixed and the direction of blockholders’ effect on leverage 
seems to vary with different types of blockholders. Ellul (2009) and Chen, et al. (2014) find a 
positive relationship between family stake and leverage; while, Michaely, et al. (2017) find a 
negative relationship between institutional holding and leverage. In fact, Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2009) find economically important blockholder fixed effects in financial policies, 
but they emphasize that different types of blockholders have heterogeneous incentives, skills, and 
investment styles, which causes the lack of blockholders’ effect on firm policies in an aggregate 
sample. 
 
Theoretical predictions regarding the direction of blockholders’ influence on leverage are also not 
clear. On the one hand, block ownership and leverage can be negatively related. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) strongly advocate for the monitoring role of blockholders in disciplining managers’ 
misbehaviors because they have sizable stakes in the firms. At the same time, Jensen (1986) 
suggests that debt can be an effective agency mechanism by committing firms’ resources to fixed 
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payments. If debt and block ownership can both play a similar role in reducing agency problems 
but debt can be expensive due to bankruptcy costs, we can expect block ownership to substitute 
for debt. Or, in the context of Myers and Majluf (1984), blockholders can have advantages in 
gathering information (Lerner, Shane, and Tsai, 2003; Sias, 2004), and therefore, reduce the 
information asymmetry problem between the firm and these investors. If that is the case, the cost 
of external equity financing can be lowered and consequently firms can use more equity and less 
debt. In short, both agency and information asymmetry models predict a negative relationship 
between block ownership and leverage.  
 
On the other hand, block ownership and leverage can be positively related. La Porta, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (2000) propose an “outcome model” in which effective governance facilitates firms to 
implement other governance mechanisms. As a result, by increasing investor protection, block 
investors enable outside shareholders to implement devices such as debt that limit management 
discretions. In addition, managers might seek to avoid debt in order to reduce the risk of bankruptcy 
and their own occupational risk (Friend and Lang, 1988; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997). 
However, if blockholders can reduce this managerial entrenchment problem, leverage would 
increase accordingly. These two arguments, the outcome model and managerial preference, both 
predict a positive relationship between block ownership and leverage. 
 
I complement and extend this line of literature on the relationship between blockholders and 
leverage by looking at corporate blockholders, another important category of blockholders that has 
not received much attention. Corporate blockholders, defined as non-financial firms that hold more 
than five percent equity in another firm, are very common in the United States and around the 
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world. Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) and Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2009) both report 
that more than 30% of their samples have at least one non-financial blockholder, while Liao (2014) 
finds that one in seven public firms around the world was a target of a corporate block partial 
acquisition. In this paper, I investigate whether and how corporate blockholders affect firm 
leverage. 
 
Block ownership by corporations is potentially different from block ownership by financial 
institutions, families, or individuals in several ways. First, corporate blockholders can possess 
specific industry knowledge or operational and technical expertise that is superior to other 
shareholders including institutional investors. Barclay et al. (2009) argue that financial investors 
are unlikely to have the technical expertise to affect firms’ operations, and they are unlikely to 
enjoy the private benefits (such as synergies in production) that are often a consideration for 
operating corporate blockholders. This information advantage can reduce the information 
asymmetry problem between corporate blockholders and firms (Lerner, Shane, and Tsai, 2003). 
Second, corporate block ownership can be beneficial in terms of business relationships, strategic 
alliances, joint ventures and financing services as described in Allen and Phillips (2000). Equity 
blocks in another firm also help to mitigate contractual limitations and strengthen business 
relationships (Fee et al., 2006). However, these strategic alliances might compromise corporate 
blockholders’ incentives to monitor since such monitoring activities can jeopardize their business 
relationships (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008). Finally, corporate blockholders on 
average have a longer investment horizon than some institutional investors, so they might have 
different incentives and opinions on how to increase firms’ value effectively. Harford, Kecskes, 
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and Mansi (2017) find that investors with long investment horizons have strong monitoring 
incentives, strengthen governance and restrain managerial misbehaviors. 
 
By empirically investigating corporate block ownership in the period 1989 to 2009 after their block 
formation, I find a strong and negative association between firm leverage and corporate block 
ownership. After block formation, firms with corporate blocks have lower leverage than other 
firms in the same industry, even though pre-block sample firms have leverage levels similar to 
those of their peers. Moreover, even after 2 to 10 years post-block formation, corporate block 
ownership is still negatively related to leverage while controlling for other well-documented 
leverage determinants. A one standard deviation increase in corporate block ownership is 
associated with a 4.2% decrease in leverage. This negative relationship between corporate block 
ownership and leverage can be interpreted in several ways. First, corporate block ownership might 
cause a downward change in leverage. Second, low leverage firms might attract corporate block 
investors. Third, both corporate blocks and leverage may be correlated with some omitted 
variables.  
 
In an attempt to distinguish among these alternative explanations, I perform several tests. First, I 
include firm-fixed effect in the model to reduce the concern of time-invariant omitted variables; 
and find that corporate blocks are still negatively related to leverage. Second, since both leverage 
and corporate ownership can be endogenously chosen, I use GMM dynamic panel estimators to 
address the econometric problems induced by unobserved firm specific effects and the joint 
endogeneity of the two interested variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Erickson and Whited, 
2002). As discussed and used in Wintoki, Link, and Netter (2012), the dynamic system GMM 
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model can help us obtain efficient estimates while including both past leverage and fixed-effects 
to account for the dynamic aspects of the leverage/corporate block ownership relation and time-
invariant unobservable heterogeneity, respectively. The association between corporate block 
ownership and leverage is still significantly negative after these specifications. 
 
Third, if the negative relationship between debt and corporate blocks indicates block ownership 
by corporations might substitute for debt in the monitoring role as mentioned earlier, we can expect 
corporate blockholders to obtain board seats to exercise their power. Therefore, I collect data on 
board representation from firms’ proxy statements to see whether these corporate blockholders do 
obtain board seats. In my sample, 61% of firms have directors designated by their corporate 
blockholders, and hold on average 25% board proportion, indicating that these operating investors 
are actively involved in governance activities. More importantly, the negative association between 
leverage and corporate block ownership becomes stronger when corporate blockholders assign 
directors and hold higher proportional representation on the target firms’ boards, supporting the 
monitoring role of corporate blockholders. In addition, when examining four different measures 
of agency costs, the negative effect of corporate block ownership on leverage is stronger in high 
agency cost firms, suggesting that an agency mechanism drives the substitution between leverage 
and corporate block ownership.  
 
Finally, from investigating Factiva news, I find that many corporate blockholders announce their 
block formation along with some sorts of business arrangements and strategic alliances. Brav, 
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) argue that one of the reasons hedge funds are more effective 
in monitoring is that compared to mutual funds, hedge funds suffer fewer conflicts of interest 
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because they do not sell products to the firms whose shares they hold. A similar argument can be 
made in the case of corporate blockholders, corporate investors who have business ties with target 
firms suffer from conflicts of interest, and might not have enough incentives to intervene with 
target firms’ managers since such actions might jeopardize their relationships.  As a result, if 
corporate blockholders play a monitoring role and can substitute for leverage, we should see this 
association become weaker with business connections. On the contrary, if corporate blockholders 
get involved in firms for business and strategic reasons, and even get board seats just to observe 
their business projects or trade credits, there should be no differences or even stronger relationship 
between leverage and corporate blocks when there exists some business arrangements between the 
two parties. The interaction test among product market relationship, leverage, and corporate block 
ownership can help to distinguish between these two alternative explanations.  
 
I collect data on product market relationships between firms and their corporate blockholders from 
Factiva news announcements on block establishment and proxy statements. I find that the negative 
association between corporate ownership and leverage intensifies when there is no product market 
relationship between corporate blockholders and target firms. This evidence is consistent with the 
story that the monitoring incentives are compromised when corporate blockholders get involved 
in target firms for strategic reasons.  
 
 I recognize that none of my tests is perfect in ruling out all alternative explanations, however, 
collectively, they make it much more difficult to find an explanation or omitted variable that can 
provide similar results across these different tests. Taken all together, the evidence on board 
representation, board proportion, agency costs, and the interaction among leverage, corporate 
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blocks, and product market relationship is consistent with the story of corporate blockholders being 
active monitors. In the sense that leverage and corporate blockholders can both be effective agency 
controls, but debt can be expensive due to bankruptcy costs, the negative relationship between 
leverage and corporate blocks documented in this paper indicates that corporate block ownership 
can substitute for leverage in the monitoring role. 
 
My paper contributes to the literature on corporate blockholders and capital structure in several 
ways. First, my paper provides more information on this specific type of blockholder and 
documents the evolution of corporate blocks after their formation through a partial acquisition or 
through an equity carveout. Second, prior studies have emphasized the product market relationship 
and factors that drive corporate block acquisitions (Allen and Phillips, 2000; Fee, Hadlock and 
Thomas, 2006; Kang and Kim, 2008; Ouimet, 2013; Liao, 2014; Nain and Wang, 2017), but none 
of these studies look at their effect on firm leverage. Finally, the findings here provide evidence 
on the important role of a component in ownership structure, i.e. corporate blockholders, in 
shaping firms’ capital structure and their interaction with the product market relationship. My 
results suggest that corporate block ownership is negatively related to leverage, and that the 
product market relationship between corporate blockholders and firms reduces the monitoring 
incentives. 
 
The paper will proceed as follows. Section II provides background information on corporate 
blockholders and hypothesis development. Section III details the data collection process and 
descriptive statistics. Sections IV then goes into the analysis and Section V concludes.  
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II. BACKGROUND ON CORPORATE BLOCK OWNERSHIP AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
Corporate blockholders are defined as nonfinancial corporations that own at least five percent 
equity in another industrial firm. There are primarily two ways in which a corporate blockholder 
can be formed: equity carveouts and partial acquisitions. Equity carveout, also known as partial 
public offering, is defined as a restructuring event in which a company launches an IPO for its 
subsidiary but only sell to the public market a small ownership percentage. Due to the nature of 
the restructuring event, the new public subsidiary inherits a corporate block from their parent firm. 
Partial acquisition, also known as minority acquisition, is defined as a transaction where the 
acquirer purchases less than 50% equity in the target firm. The target firm in a partial acquisition 
still remains as a going concern after the transaction as opposed to getting folded into the acquirer 
as in a full acquisition.  
 
For example, in 2000, in connection with a long-term distribution agreement for the installation of 
XM radios in General Motors vehicles, General Motors acquired a 20% stake in XM Satellite 
Radio through a partial acquisition and maintained this equity block until 2007 when XM was 
acquired by Sirius. Another example, Eli Lilly and Co. acquired an 11% stake in United 
Therapeutics Corp. in a private placement to exchange for a product licensing agreement in 2008. 
An example of a corporate block formed by an equity carveout is PepsiCo and Pepsi Bottling 
Group (PBG). In 1999, PepsiCo separated out its bottling business into an independent public 
company, but retained a 40% stake until 2009 when it reacquired PBG. Another example of 
carved-out block formation, Sunoco Inc. launched a partial IPO for Sunoco Logistics in 2002, but 
keep at least 32% ownership until 2011.  
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I recognize that corporate block formation is not random, which introduces potential endogeneity 
problems in the relationship between leverage and corporate blocks. Therefore, before going into 
the hypothesis development, the following subsection will provide some more background 
information on the motivation of how corporate blocks get established in the first place. 
1. Motivations for Corporate Block Formation 
A. Product Market Relationships and the Contracting Motive 
In the context of product market relationships, equity investment can be considered a form of 
partial integration between two partner companies. Williamson (1979) and Grossman and Hart 
(1986) present theoretical arguments that equity stakes can be used to reduce transaction and 
contracting costs. Block ownership between corporations could also be useful in aligning the 
incentives of the firms involved in alliances or joint ventures, which encourages them to commit 
to product market relationships or other project-specific assets.  
 
Empirically, Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) both find that block 
ownership by corporations has significant product market benefits since it provides greater 
incentives for both parties and allows firms to extend their product market without experiencing a 
huge cost of full acquisitions. In a similar note, Boone (2002) reports that in more than half of her 
equity carveout sample, parents maintain their holding longer than 4 years when they have product 
market relationship with the units. As an anecdotal evidence, while talking about the partial 
acquisition of an 18% stake between Delphi Automotive Systems and DuraSwitch in 2000, David 
Heilman, vice president of Delphi, said that "An equity stake in DuraSwitch adds a strategic switch 
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component to Delphi's technology portfolio, and will enable Delphi to pursue growth beyond the 
automotive market."   
 
In my sample, 59% of firms with corporate blocks get their ownership stakes accompanied by 
some business arrangements, usually joint ventures or strategic alliances, with the target firms. For 
example, in 2010, Actavis, Inc. purchased 13% equity of Columbia Laboratories in pursuant to 
their purchase and collaboration agreement. In 2008, Eli Lilly and Co. acquired an 11% stake in 
United Therapeutics Corp. for commercial rights and supply agreements for certain drugs. 
B. Financial Constraints and the Financing Motive 
Prior research on equity carveouts and partial acquisitions both find that firms involved in these 
transactions are partly motivated by new financing. In equity carveouts, parent firms might want 
to raise financing for both parents and subsidiaries without sending negative signals to the market 
about the parent firms’ stocks (Schipper and Smith, 1986; Nanda, 1991). According to Miles and 
Woolridge (1999), proceeds from the IPO in equity carveouts are often used for several purposes 
such as repaying loans to the parent firm, financing new investments in the subsidiary, or paying 
off the parent firm’s debt.  
 
In partial acquisitions, target firms that are facing high market frictions have incentives to seek 
financing from equity private placement investors (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) including their 
business partners. Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Lerner et al. (2003) argue that a trade partner or 
a firm in a related industry might possess substantial knowledge and experience that makes it a 
cheaper source of external financing than public investors. Indeed, Ouimet (2013) and Liao (2014) 
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find that a partial acquisition is more likely to occur when targets are financially constrained or 
can benefit from certification by an acquirer’s equity investment.  
C. Other Motives 
Firms might also choose to perform an equity carveout to provide additional incentives for their 
managers as suggested by Schipper and Smith (1986). Divisional managers can become executives 
at the new publicly traded subsidiaries, and their compensation is tied to stock performance. 
Moreover, parent firms might want to increase public interest in their subsidiaries and reduce 
information asymmetry about the value of multi-segment firms without experiencing negative 
effects from the market as in the case of parents’ seasoned equity offerings.  
 
For partial acquisitions, acquirers might use this equity investment as the first step to a full scale 
acquisition that allows the acquirers to learn more about the targets and their synergies (Ouimet, 
2013). This motivation is actually different from a traditional toehold since the motivation is based 
on learning, reducing information asymmetry, rather than taking advantage of the target’s low 
share price before the rise in takeover announcements. In supporting this motivation, Higgins and 
Rodriquez (2006) report that acquirers who previously had strategic alliances with their target 
firms (where such alliances are often accompanied by equity stakes) realize higher returns at the 
announcement of majority acquisitions.  
 
2. Corporate Block Ownership and Capital Structure 
Prior literature in capital structures has emphasized the role of main market frictions such as 
agency and information asymmetry on leverage decisions. Corporate blockholders have several 
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characteristics that can affect the severity of these market frictions. More specifically, with their 
large ownership positions, corporate blockholders can alleviate agency problems as suggested by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, the business relationships between some corporate 
blockholders and target firms might reduce their monitoring incentives (Brav, et al., 2008). In 
addition, corporate blockholders are corporations themselves, so they can have superior industrial 
and operational information, which reduces information asymmetry between them and the firms 
(Lerner, et al., 2003).  
 
As mentioned above, there are several reasons why corporate blockholders might influence capital 
structure decisions, however existing theories seem to have ambiguous predictions regarding the 
direction of this relationship between corporate block ownership and leverage.  
 
On the one hand, corporate blocks and leverage can be negatively correlated. According to Jensen 
(1986), shareholders can commit firms’ free cash flows to fixed payments and restrict managers’ 
overinvestment, therefore debt can be an effective agency mechanism. However, debt can be costly 
because of bankruptcy costs. At the same time, corporate blockholders with their sizable stake 
have enough incentives and power to be effective monitors. Indeed, Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and 
Smith (1993) find that private placement discounts in partial acquisitions reflect compensation to 
partial acquirers for anticipated monitoring costs and that positive abnormal returns reflect the 
expected benefit of increased monitoring. Following this line of argument under agency models, I 
conjecture that, since corporate blocks and leverage can be substitutes as monitoring devices, there 
exists a negative association between corporate block ownership and leverage.  
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In addition, in regards to the information asymmetry problem mentioned in Myers and Majluf 
(1984), corporate blockholders with their superior industrial knowledge (Lerner, et al., 2003; Sias, 
2004) can reduce information asymmetry problem between the firm and these investors. 
Consequently, the cost of external equity financing becomes lowered and therefore firms can use 
more equity and less debt. In short, the information asymmetry argument also predicts a negative 
relationship between corporate block ownership and leverage. 
 
On the other hand, corporate blocks and leverage can be positively related. La Porta et al. (2000) 
propose an outcome model in which firms with effective governance system enable shareholders 
to implement other mechanisms to limit managers’ discretion including dividends and other fixed 
payments (such as interests), or in other words, a change in leverage is an outcome of an effective 
monitoring system. In the sense that corporate blockholders can mitigate agency costs and promote 
good governance, corporate blocks and debt can be positively related.  
 
Furthermore, managers might want to seek lower debt ratios to reduce the risk of bankruptcy and 
job loss because their personal wealth is tied to the firm. Friend and Lang (1988) find a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and leverage because of managerial self-interest, and 
suggest that only the presence of non-managerial large stakeholders would resolve this problem. 
On a similar note, Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) find that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid 
debt, and that leverage increases in response to entrenchment-reducing shocks such as the addition 
of major stockholders. Therefore, as corporate blockholders get involved and limit managers’ 
misbehaviors, leverage would increase accordingly. In short, both the outcome model and 
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managerial preference argument predict a positive association between leverage and corporate 
block ownership. 
 
In summary, it is still an empirical question whether corporate blockholders are associated with 
firm leverage and what is the direction and interpretation of such association if it exists. The next 
section will describe the data sample selection to examine these research questions.  
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
1. Sample Selection 
My initial sample starts with SDC Platinum for the period 1989 to 2009 since ownership data are 
not consistently available prior to 1989. The sample of U.S. equity carveouts is from the SDC 
Global New Issues Database with flag spinoff/carveout. I verify each transaction to make sure that 
it is an equity carveout (not a spinoff) where parent firms retain a block ownership in the new 
public firms after the IPOs; this yields 411 carveouts for public parents and public units. The U.S. 
partial acquisition sample is from SDC Mergers and Acquisitions, this gives 493 partial 
acquisitions for public targets and public acquirers. This small number of U.S. domestic partial 
acquisitions is due to the fact that most partial acquisitions are cross-border deals. According to 
Liao (2014) who studies minority acquisitions around the world, only 15% of partial acquisitions 
are U.S. domestic deals, the rest 29% are cross-border, and 55% are domestic deals in non-US 
countries. 
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Following prior literature, I exclude any transactions involving financial and utilities firms. I also 
exclude carveouts in which parents retain more than 95% or below 5% ownership and transactions 
where partial acquirers sell blocks within one year, or if any of parent/unit, acquirer/target firms 
have less than 2 years of financial data in Compustat, reducing the sample to 183 carveouts and 
156 partial acquisitions. Since SDC only provides the initial level of ownership at the time of the 
events, I hand-collect subsequent ownership data for following 1 to 10 years from 10-K annual 
reports, proxy statements1, and Thomson One2 databases. Total institutional ownership and 
ownership concentration are from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings. Due to the 
limited availability of ownership data, my final sample consists of 129 carveouts and 111 partial 
acquisitions for a panel data of 1,311 firm-year observations. 
 
2. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the distribution of equity carveouts and partial acquisitions occurring in each year 
during the sample period 1989-2009. These events seem to be more popular in the earlier period 
before 2000 or it might be that the trend has moved toward more private parents and foreign 
acquirers as indicated in prior literature and therefore, not many U.S. public firms are left in my 
sample. 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for corporate block ownership in the sample. Panel A 
presents the ownership structure of firms in the full corporate block sample. The size of an average 
corporate block is quite large, about 32% (21% median), so we can expect them to have enough 
                                                 
1 SEC provides annual reports and proxy statements from 1996. 
2 Thomson One provides scanned images of annual reports and proxy statements before 1996.  
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incentives and power to influence firm policies. Panel B and C in Table 2 provide the details on 
ownership structures in firms that are involved in equity carveouts and partial acquisitions. On 
average, parent firms retain 48% ownership in the carved-out units, while partial acquirers hold 
about 17% ownership in the partial targets. In addition, as shown in Table 2, Panel D, both parent 
firms and partial acquirers maintain their blocks for more than 4 years on average, suggesting that 
corporate blockholders do keep a long-term relationship with their target firms. This is one of the 
reasons why we might expect to see a monitoring effect from corporate blockholders since 
investors with long investment horizons have more incentives to strengthen corporate governance 
and restrain managerial misbehaviors (Harford et al., 2017).  
 
Table 2, panel E shows the summary statistics for board representation and product market 
relationship in the corporate block sample. If corporate blockholders are actively involved in target 
firms’ governance, one way they can exercise their rights is through obtaining board seats. 
Therefore, I hand-collect information on board of directors in the target firms from their proxy 
statements. Board representation by corporate blockholders is defined when directors are 
nominated by corporate blockholders or directors are serving on the boards of both targets and 
acquirers. In the full corporate block sample, 61% of target firm have board representation from 
their corporate blockholders. This number is very close to the statistics reported by Barclay et al. 
(2009): 69% of their sample of operating blockholders have board representation. More 
specifically, since carved-out firms originated from the parent firms, the board of directors in these 
new public subsidiaries are appointed by parent firms, in 86% of carved-out firms. In partial 
acquisitions, 35% of target firms also get directors designated by their partial acquirers. From their 
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proxy statements, some firms stated that corporate blockholders only assign an observer to sit on 
the board, but do not assign a director.  
 
Table 2, panel E also reports the board proportion held by corporate blockholders. Board 
proportion is calculated as the number of directors designated by corporate blockholders divided 
by the total number of directors on target firms’ boards. On average, corporate blockholders hold 
25% board proportion (17% median), suggesting that they have enough power to influence firm 
policies if they want to.  
 
Moreover, since product market is one of the major reasons why corporate investors establish their 
blocks as mentioned in Section II, I hand-collect the product market relationship from Factiva 
news and proxy statements. I perform a Factiva news search and define a corporate blockholder to 
have a business relationship, a strategic alliance, or a product agreement with the target firm if 
they mention it in their proxy statements under section “Certain Relationships and Related 
Transaction”; or if they specify it in their transaction announcements. For example, according to 
PR Newswire, on August 12th, 2002, “Zomax Inc. (Nasdaq:ZOMX), an international outsourcing 
provider of process management services, and Intraware, Inc. (Nasdaq:ITRA), a leading provider 
of global electronic software delivery and management (ESDM) solutions, jointly announced that 
they have entered into a strategic alliance in which Zomax will market and resell Intraware's 
flagship SubscribeNet ESDM service to its global customer base. Zomax has also invested $5 
million dollars in a private equity placement for an ownership stake of approximately 12%.” In 
my sample, as shown in Table 2, Panel E, 59% of firms have some sorts of business relationships 
with their corporate blockholders. 
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Table 3 shows the evolution of corporate block ownership following the events. By collecting 
ownership data from proxy statements, I track the ownership position of corporate blockholders 
for the following 1 to 10 years after their block formation and see how their stakes change over 
time. The number of firm observations in each year after the block formation varies over time due 
to the limited ownership data in the early period and mergers, acquisitions or bankruptcies. As 
documented in Table 3, corporate blockholders seem to reduce their block ownership over time, 
slowly during the first 5 years, then eventually reduce blocks to zero. One reason stated in the 
proxy statements for the maintenance of these blocks in the first few years is the product market 
relationship. For example, Vermillion Inc. and Quest Diagnostics entered into a strategic alliance 
agreement in July 2005 accompanied by 20% equity investment to develop and commercialize 
three diagnostic tests. The original term for their business relationship was for three years, then 
they extended the agreement and finally terminated it in August 2013. Quest Diagnostics 
maintained around 20% ownership during the 8-year term of their agreement and then ceased their 
ownership in Vermillion to zero in 2013. 
 
Table 4 summarizes firm characteristics of firms with corporate blocks in my sample. Book 
leverage is measured as debt in current liabilities (DLC) plus total long-term debt (DLTT) divided 
by total assets (AT). Following Denis and McKeon (2012), I calculate Market leverage as:  
Market Leverage it = 
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇+𝐷𝐿𝐶
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇+𝐷𝐿𝐶+(𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶∗𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂)
 
where DLTT is the amount of long-term debt, DLC is debt in current liabilities, including the 
portion of long-term debt due within one year, PRCC is the year-end common share price, and 
CSHO is the year-end number of common shares outstanding. I use both book and market leverage 
in my analysis, but the results are similar, so I only analyze the results with market leverage. 
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Market-to-Book is computed as: 
𝑀/𝐵𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡− 𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡+(𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡∗𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑖𝑡)+ 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐿𝑖𝑡 
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
 
where AT is total assets, SEQ is book equity, TXDITC is deferred tax, PRCC is the year-end 
common share price, CSHO is the year-end number of common shares outstanding, and PSTKL is 
liquidation value of preferred stock.  
 
Profitability is operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) over total assets, tangibility is fixed 
assets (PPENT) over total assets, and firm size is the natural log of total assets. Other financial 
ratios are scaled by total assets. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%, and are summarized 
in Appendix A. 
 
As shown in Table 4, Panel A and B, on average, firms with corporate blocks have a leverage ratio 
(both book leverage and market leverage) that is significantly lower than other firms in the same 
industry (t-test p-value is less than 0.001). Furthermore, these firms seem to be smaller, hold more 
cash, and higher R&D than other firms in their industries, somewhat consistent with these firms 
being financially constrained and financing motivated for having corporate blocks as mentioned 
in Section II. 
 
Panel C, Table 4 provides firm characteristics before corporate block formation. Note that since 
equity carveouts create new public firms at the time of the events, this table only includes financial 
information about pre-block formation of firms with blocks formed via partial acquisitions. Partial 
targets also seem to be financially constrained with smaller firm size, lower tangibility and high 
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R&D, which is consistent with existing evidence that firms which are in need of financing are 
more likely to be involved in partial acquisitions (Ouimet, 2013; Liao, 2014). More importantly, 
book leverage and market leverage of firms before block formation are not much different from 
their peers. 
 
Moreover, firms often carveout subsidiaries that are unrelated to their core businesses in an attempt 
for restructuring; in fact, in my sample, only 34% of subsidiaries are in the same 2-digit SIC code 
industry with their parents. On the other hand, partial acquirers often hold equity blocks in related-
industry targets (58% in my sample), again might be due to their business alliances and joint 
ventures.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
1. Corporate Blockholders and Leverage 
I first start with a cross-sectional analysis to see if there is any difference between leverage of firms 
with low corporate block ownership and firms with high corporate blocks. Firms in my sample are 
divided into four quartiles based on the ranking of corporate block ownership in the first year after 
their block formation. As shown in both panels in Table 5, both market leverage and book leverage 
seem to decrease monotonically as firms move from the lowest quartile in corporate ownership to 
the highest quartile. This is the first piece of evidence that corporate block ownership has a 
negative association with leverage.  
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Next, to investigate whether corporate blockholders play an important role in target firms’ capital 
structure in a multivariate setting, I examine the determinants of firm leverage after the formation 
of corporate blocks. I regress the target firm leverage on the corporate blockholders’ ownership 
stakes and leverage while controlling for other well-documented leverage determinants including 
industry median leverage, market-to-book, profitability, firm size, tangibility, and expected 
inflation3 (Frank and Goyal, 2009). The main regression is as follows:  
 
Target firm’s Leverage it = α + β1 Corporate Block Ownership i,t-1 + β2 Industry Median 
Leverage i,t-1  + β3Market-to-Book i,t-1  + β4 Profitability i,t-1 + β5 Firm Size i,t-1  + β6Tangibility i,t-1   
+ β7Inflation i,t-1 + β8Corporate blockholders’ leverage i,t-1 + Є (1) 
 
My main regression results are presented in Table 6 for the full sample, and in Appendix B for 
subsamples of carveouts and partial acquisitions. In Table 6, Panel A, column 1 shows the OLS 
regression of target firm leverage on corporate block ownership stakes and several well-
documented determinants of leverage in the literature, and they all have the expected signs: 
negative coefficients for market-to-book and profitability, and positive coefficients for industry 
median leverage, firm size, tangibility, and inflation. I notice that corporate blockholders’ leverage 
is positively and significantly related to the target firm’s leverage. I conjecture that it might be due 
to managerial specific effect (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011) or 
product markets (additional tests in Table 9 discussed in later sections). More importantly, the 
coefficient of corporate block ownership is negative and significant. Column 2 in Table 6 uses 
firm fixed effects specification to reduce the concern that unobservable time-invariant firm 
                                                 
3 Expected inflation data is available on https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/our-research/indicators-and-data/inflation-
expectations.aspx 
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characteristics are driving the results. The corporate block ownership is still negatively related to 
firm leverage in fixed effects regression.  
 
In term of economic significance, using the coefficients in fixed effects regression, a one standard 
deviation (std) increase in corporate block ownership is associated with a 4.2% decrease in the 
firm’s market leverage. Compared to the economic significance of other determinants, a one std 
increase in industry median leverage is associated with a 5.1% increase in firm leverage; a one std 
increase in profitability is associated with a 1.7% decrease in firm leverage; and a one std increase 
in market-to-book is associated with a 1.6% decrease in firm leverage. 
 
The negative association between corporate block ownership and leverage documented in Table 5 
and 6 can be interpreted in several ways. First, corporate blocks might reduce leverage in the target 
firms. Second, low leverage firms can attract corporate blockholders. Finally, both leverage and 
corporate block ownership are associated with some time-varying omitted variables. In an attempt 
to discriminate among these alternative explanations, I perform several tests: first, I used dynamic 
GMM system estimators, second I used an interaction with board representation, third, an 
interaction with different agency cost measures, and fourth, an interaction with product market 
relationship.  
 
The dynamic panel GMM estimator is developed in a series of papers by Holtz-Eskin, Newey, and 
Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998). As argued in Wintoki et 
al. (2012), this method improves on OLS and traditional fixed effects estimates in several ways. 
First, unlike OLS, we can include firm-fixed effects to account for unobservable heterogeneity. 
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Second, unlike traditional fixed-effects, it allows block ownership to be influenced by previous 
realizations of, or shocks to past leverage. Third, unlike either OLS or traditional fixed effects 
estimates, a key insight of the dynamic panel GMM estimator is that the underlying economic 
process itself is dynamic – in my case, if corporate block ownership is related to past leverage – 
then it may be possible to use some combination of variables from the firm’s history as valid 
instruments to account for simultaneity. Thus, an important aspect of the methodology is that it 
relies on a set of “internal” instruments contained within the panel itself. This eliminates the need 
for external instruments. 
 
The basic estimation procedure consists of two steps: first, I rewrite the model (1) to include lagged 
leverage and other variables in first-differenced form: 
ΔLeverageit = α + µρ ∑ ΔLeverage𝑖𝑡−ρ  + β ΔCorporate Block Ownership i,t-1 + γΔZi,t-1 + Δ Єit (2) 
 
First-differencing eliminates any potential bias that may arise from time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. After first-differencing, I estimate (2) via GMM using lagged values of the 
explanatory variables as instruments for the current explanatory variables. That is, I use historical 
values of leverage, ownership, and other firm characteristics variables as instruments for current 
changes in these variables. 
 
The result for the dynamic GMM estimators is shown in Panel B, Table 6. Besides the coefficient 
for inflation that loses its significance, other leverage determinants are significant and have the 
expected signs. More importantly, corporate block ownership is still negatively related to leverage, 
indicating that corporate ownership has a negative effect on firm leverage. 
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As pointed out by Wintoki et al. (2012), the biggest concern when using dynamic GMM estimators 
is whether or not I have included enough lags to control for the dynamic aspects of the empirical 
relationship. If I have, then any historical value of a firm’s leverage beyond those lags is a 
potentially valid instrument since it will be exogenous to current leverage changes. For my GMM 
estimates, if the assumptions of my specification are valid, by constructions, the residuals in first 
differences should be correlated, but there should be no correlation in second differences and 
higher. I use Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test to check the serial correlation in second-order and 
higher, the results are shown in Table 6, Panel C. The insignificant p-values for second to fourth-
order confirm that there is no serial correlation in second differences and higher, and the 
instruments are valid. 
 
The dynamic panel estimation methodology has its own limitation as mentioned in Wintoki et al. 
(2012). First, it relies on using the firm’s history (lags of dependent and independent variables) for 
identification. Thus, there is a potential problem with weak instruments, which becomes greater as 
the number of lags of the instrumental variables increases. This represents an empirical trade-off 
between the exogeneity and the strength of the instruments: increasing the instruments’ lag length 
makes them more exogenous, but may also make them weaker. Second, Griliches and Hausman 
(1986) note that the bias resulting from errors in variables may be magnified when using panel 
data estimators. Since the dynamic panel GMM estimator relies on first-differencing, dynamic 
panel estimators may not eliminate measurement error bias. Finally, it is possible that any cross-
sectional regression of leverage on corporate block ownership is mis-specified and that there are 
omitted time-varying unobserved variables that affect both leverage and corporate block 
ownership. However, misspecification is likely to be as big a problem with OLS and traditional 
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fixed-effects estimation as well. Therefore, despite the mentioned limitations of the dynamic 
GMM estimator, it likely still dominates inference from OLS or fixed-effects estimation if the 
underlying economic process is dynamic. 
 
In summary, results in Table 5 and 6 show that the negative association between corporate block 
ownership and leverage is strong and robust. The next section will investigate further the 
explanation for the negative relationship between leverage and corporate block ownership.  
 
2. Corporate Blockholders and Governance Activities  
a. Board of Directors 
The results so far have shown that corporate blockholders and leverage have a negative association. 
One possible explanation is that both debt and corporate blockholders can be considered as 
effective monitoring mechanisms as suggested by agency models (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986); however, debt can be costly due to bankruptcy costs, therefore we can expect these 
two monitoring devices to substitute for each other, which leads to their negative relationship. To 
further explore the monitoring possibility of corporate blockholders, in this section, I examine one 
specific type of governance activities that corporate blockholders might initiate after the block 
formation: board representation. Board representation can be considered as active involvement of 
corporate blockholders in target firms’ decisions (Smith, 1996). If corporate blockholders really 
play a monitoring role in target firms, one important way they can exercise their power is by 
obtaining board seats. 
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I collected information about board representation from proxy statements for the following 2 to 10 
years from the date of block formation. Board representation by corporate blockholders is defined 
when a director is nominated by corporate blockholders or a director in serving on the boards of 
both targets and acquirers. As summarized in Table 2, panel E, 61% of firms have directors 
designated by their corporate blockholders. More specifically, since carved-out firms are originally 
divisions or subsidiaries of parent firms, the board representation happens in 86% of the equity 
carveout sample; while in partial acquisitions, 34% of target firms have directors designated by 
their partial acquirers. 
 
More importantly, Table 7 Panel A reveals that the negative relationship between leverage and 
corporate block ownership is driven by firms that have board representation from corporate 
blockholders. The coefficient of board representation is negative and significant. More 
importantly, the interaction term between corporate block ownership and board representation is 
negative and significant, indicating that the effect of corporate blocks on leverage is stronger for 
firms that have board representation. In order words, the negative association between leverage 
and corporate blockholders only exists for “active” corporate blockholders.  This result supports 
the involvement of corporate blockholders in governance activities, and the leverage change due 
to corporate blockholders’ monitoring role. 
 
Furthermore, instead of using just a dummy variable for board representation, in Table 7 Panel B 
(and Appendix C for subsamples), I use the percentage of board domination represented by 
corporate blockholders’ nominated directors to further test the involvement of corporate 
blockholders in target firms’ governance activities. The higher percentage of the board dominated 
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by corporate blockholders’ members, the more power they have to influence target firms’ leverage 
decisions. The variable “board proportion” is measured as the number of directors nominated by 
corporate blockholders divided by the total number of directors on the board. I collect data on 
board proportion using firms’ proxy statements. On average, corporate blockholders hold 25% 
(17% median) of target firms’ boards. The coefficient of the interaction term between board 
proportion and corporate block ownership in Table 7 panel B is negative and significant, indicating 
that board power possessed by corporate blockholders intensifies the negative relationship between 
leverage and corporate blockholders. In summary, the results in both panels of Table 7 point 
toward the story that corporate blockholders are actively involved in target firms’ governance to  
partially influence firms’ debt policies. 
b. Agency Costs 
The results in previous sections suggest that the monitoring role of corporate blockholders can 
explain the negative relationship between their ownership and leverage of target firms. A natural 
question to ask is which mechanism enables them to do so. It is difficult to identify the precise 
mechanism through which corporate blockholders exert their influence on firm leverage, therefore, 
in this section, I perform an indirect test to show that such a mechanism exists. I follow the 
Michaely, et al. (2017) approach to test if such an agency mechanism underlies the negative 
relationship between corporate block ownership and leverage. I extend the main regression in 
equation (1) to include interactions with different measures of agency costs. The idea here is that 
if corporate blockholders are actively involved in firms’ governance, their role would be more 
important in firms where agency costs are high, i.e. their relationship with leverage would be 
stronger with higher agency costs. 
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In Table 8, I analyze how the relationship between corporate ownership and leverage changes with 
firm characteristics that capture heterogeneity in potential agency costs within my sample of firms 
over time. I use four alternative measures of agency costs suggested by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) 
and Michaely, et al. (2017). The first measure is total assets over sales or the inverse of asset 
turnover, a measure of how effectively the firm's management deploys its assets. A firm whose 
sales-to-asset ratio is lower experiences positive agency cost. These costs might arise because 
managers act in some ways that do not maximize firm value: make poor investment decisions, 
exert insufficient effort, or consume executive perquisites. The second measure is operating 
expenses over sales, a measure of how effectively the firm's management controls operating costs, 
including excessive perquisite consumption, and other direct agency costs. For both measures, the 
higher the ratios are, the higher agency costs these firms experience.  
 
The next two measures are used in Michaely, et al. (2017)4. For the third measure, I define a high 
agency cost firm as a large market capitalization firm with few growth opportunities; these firms 
are more prone to free cash flow problems (Jensen, 1986). My fourth definition of a high agency 
cost firm examines low sales growth but high Selling, General and Administrative (SG&A) 
expense firms. SG&A costs represent a significant proportion of the costs of business operations. 
According to Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman, (2003) on average, the SG&A costs to total 
assets ratio is 27 percent, compared to the research and development (R&D) to total assets ratio of 
3 percent. The intuition of this agency cost measure comes from the accounting literature that 
demonstrates SG&A expenses increase more rapidly when demand increases than they decline 
                                                 
4 Michaely, et al. (2017) also use another measure of previous non-core acquisitions for agency costs. However, 
about half of my sample are equity carved-out firms who do not have historical operation to have sufficient data for 
this measure. 
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when demand decreases (Anderson, et al., 2003; Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis, 2012). This definition 
captures the idea that empire building managers are likely to increase SG&A costs rapidly by 
adding employees and awarding bonuses too quickly when sales go up and to decrease SG&A 
costs too slowly by delaying deductions to payroll, travel, and entertainment expenses when sales 
go down.  
 
As shown in Table 8, across different measures of agency costs, the negative effect of corporate 
block ownership on leverage intensifies in high agency cost firms. Because the importance of 
agency costs remains robust across four alternative definitions, each of which captures a nuance 
of managerial potential for agency conflicts, it is comforting my inference that an agency 
mechanism is a meaningful explanation for the negative relationship is not fragile to a single 
definitional assumption. These results in Table 8 reassure the inference that an agency mechanism 
can provide an explanation for the substitution between leverage and corporate block ownership. 
 
3. Corporate Blockholders and Product Market Relationship 
Since a majority of corporate blocks seem to establish their ownership positions to accompany a 
specific venture or business agreement with the target firms as mentioned in Section III, I consider 
this as an important factor that might influence the relationship between corporate blockholders 
and leverage. As argued by Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) mutual funds have more 
conflicts of interest than hedge funds in terms of monitoring since mutual funds often have 
business relationships with firms whose shares they hold. Similarly, corporate blockholders might 
not have enough incentives to monitor and intervene with target firms’ governance activities since 
such actions might jeopardize their business relationships. In addition, if these strategic reasons 
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for establishing the block position are correlated with the optimal leverage, then the documented 
effects might be not due to the corporate block ownership per se, but rather, to the underlying 
strategic reason for forming the block. For example, corporate blockholders obtain board seats to 
monitor their specific business arrangements, and might be not for the target firm’s governance in 
general.  
 
In order to address this concern, I include product market relationship and its interaction with 
corporate blocks as explanatory variables. On the one hand, if corporate blockholders really have 
a monitoring effect on the target firms, we should expect to see the effects remain or even 
strengthen in the case of no business ties since they have more incentives to monitor and less 
conflicts of interest. On the other hand, if corporate blockholders have a strategic relationship with 
target firms, and leverage changes are the results of that strategic reason, we should not see such 
association between leverage and corporate block ownership in cases where no such strategic 
relationship exists. Therefore, the test in this section should help us distinguish between the 
monitoring effect of corporate blockholders and the strategic motivation for corporate block 
formation. 
 
Table 9 Panel A presents the results. The coefficient on the interaction term between corporate 
blocks and product market is insignificant while the coefficient on corporate blocks alone is 
negative and significant, indicating that corporate blocks have a negative effect on firm leverage 
even when there are no business ties between the two parties. In addition, as summarized in Table 
2 Panel E, about 44% of firms that have no product market with corporate blockholders still have 
board representation from these operating investors. These results support the monitoring effect of 
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corporate blockholders and rule out the alternative explanation that corporate blocks only care 
when they have product market relationship with target firms.  
 
The last two columns in Table 9 Panel A explore how product markets play a role in the positive 
relationship between corporate blockholders’ leverage and target firms’ leverage observed in all 
previous leverage regressions. Leary and Roberts (2014) find that smaller, financial policies of 
less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers. Firms with 
corporate blocks in my sample are on average smaller than their peers as shown in Table 4. I 
conjecture that when corporate blockholders and target firms share some product market 
relationships, their cultures and operations have more similarities, which makes the “peer effect” 
between their leverage even stronger. The interaction term between product market and corporate 
blockholders’ leverage in column 3 and 4 is positive and significant, suggesting that product 
market strengthens the positive relationship between two firms’ financial policies.  
 
Another related concern with the results presented in previous sections is that corporate 
blockholders who have a vertical relationship with target firms can also offer an alternative 
explanation. Corporate blockholders can obtain board seats just to monitor their trade credits with 
no intention to get involved in firms’ governance activities. In order to address this concern, I 
collected the details on the nature of their business relationship from proxy statements, annual 
reports 10-k and Factiva news on their block announcements. I re-ran the regressions in Table 9 
and used the “vertical” variable instead of “product” dummy variable, vertical equals 1 if firms 
involve in buyer-supplier relationships with their corporate blockholders, and 0 otherwise. The 
results shown in Table 8 Panel B. The coefficient on vertical and its interaction term with corporate 
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blocks are not significant, indicating that vertical relationship does not explain the negative effect 
of corporate blockholder ownership on target firms’ leverage.  
 
Furthermore, the results with product market relationship in this section rule out the story of 
information asymmetry which also predicts a negative association between corporate blockholders 
and leverage. Under the information asymmetry argument, since corporate blockholders have 
informational advantages over other investors (Lerner, et al., 2003), the information asymmetry 
problem associated with equity issuance (Myers and Majluf, 1984) is reduced, hence firms can use 
more equity and less debt. If this is true, we should see the association between corporate 
blockholders and leverage become stronger when firms are involved in business ventures since 
they would share even more information during the collaborative process, effectively reducing the 
cost of equity financing. However, the results in Table 8 show that it is not the case. 
 
4. Corporate Blockholders and Institutional Ownership 
The previous sections provide some evidence on the negative association between corporate 
blockholders and target firms’ leverage, indicating that corporate blockholders might have some 
monitoring effect on the target firms and they can substitute for other monitoring devices including 
leverage. In the sense that institutional investors are also very active in their monitoring role (Gillan 
and Starks, 2000; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007).), next I want to explore 
how the presence of corporate blockholders in firms’ ownership structures affects the institutional 
holdings.  
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Table 10 presents the regression results on institutional ownership of target firms. I obtained 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings. Controlling 
variables are firm size, profitability, and market-to-book based on the evidence in prior research. 
Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that institutional investors have a strong 
demand for large, stable, and liquid stocks because of their liquidity and transaction-cost motives. 
Chung and Zhang (2011) find that institutional investors prefer firms with good governance 
practices to meet fiduciary responsibility and to minimize monitoring and exit costs.  
 
Table 10 shows that corporate block ownership is significantly and negatively related to 
institutional ownership of target firms, suggesting corporate blocks might substitute for 
institutional holdings in the monitoring role. I argue that since there already exists a corporate 
blockholder to monitor, institutional investors might find it less beneficial for them to come in and 
intervene with the target firms. Other control variables have the expected signs: larger firms with 
higher market valuation seem to attract more institutional investors. 
 
One might argue that this negative relationship between corporate ownership and institutional 
ownership is simply the mechanical effect within the firm’s ownership structure. However, the 
results in Table 11 and 12 provide further evidence on the substitution effect between corporate 
blocks and institutional holdings. The product market relationship between target firms and 
corporate blocks can help us distinguish between these two explanations.  
 
If it is simply the mechanical effect, we should always see the negative association between 
corporate blocks and institutional ownership regardless of whether or not the target firms have a 
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product market relationship with their corporate blockholders. However, if these two blockholders 
are substitutes for monitoring devices, we should see their negative association become stronger 
in the case where corporate blockholders have more monitoring incentives, i.e. no business ties 
with the target firms since there are less conflicts of interest. 
 
As reported in Table 11, the coefficients on product market and corporate blocks are both 
significant in the fixed-effects regression on firms’ institutional ownership, but have opposite 
signs. In term of magnitude, the two coefficients cancel out each other when product=1, and the 
coefficient on corporate ownership is still significantly negative when product=0. This result 
indicates that corporate block ownership only substitutes for institutional ownership in the 
monitoring role when they have no business ties with target firms, or greater incentives to monitor 
and less conflicts of interest.  
 
Finally, since Michaely et al. (2017) find that institutional ownership has a negative effect on 
leverage due to their monitoring role, in Table 12, I re-run my main regression (1) to include 
institutional ownership as an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient on institutional 
ownership loses its significance in the fixed effects regression, while the coefficient on corporate 
ownership remains negative and significant. This result supports the substitution effect between 
corporate blockholders and institutional investors in the monitoring role. In summary, the findings 
in this section confirm the monitoring effect of corporate blockholders, and these corporate holders 
can substitute for other monitoring devices including leverage and institutional investors.  
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5. Robustness Check 
One concern on the results in equity carved-out firms included in the full sample examined in 
previous sections is that they might be driven by the majority ownership of parent firms. Therefore, 
for a robustness check, I performed a sub-sample analysis on a sample of equity carveouts with 
less than 50% equity held by parent firms. In Table 13, I repeated the regressions in previous 
sections of parent block ownership on target’s leverage and institutional ownership, and found that 
the results stay robust in this sub-sample. Minority interest of parent firms is still negatively related 
to leverage and institutional ownership of public subsidiaries.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the relationship between corporate block ownership and capital structure. 
Since corporate blockholders can be formed primarily by two methods, equity carveouts and 
partial acquisitions, I examine the evolution of corporate blockholders after these events occurred 
in the period 1989 to 2009. I find that corporate block ownership is negatively related to leverage 
and institutional ownership of the target firms in both fixed effects and dynamic GMM regressions. 
These associations are stronger in the cases where corporate blockholders have board 
representation on the target firms, when firms experience high agency costs,  and when they do 
not have business ties with the target firms, i.e. when their monitoring incentives are not 
compromised for strategic business reasons. This result is consistent with the story that corporate 
blockholders play an important monitoring role and can substitute for other agency controls 
including leverage and institutional ownership. My findings also provide support for the influence 
of ownership structures on capital structures, and the heterogenous effect of different types of 
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blockholders on corporate policies. Some possibilities for interesting future research venues 
include the choices between different agency control mechanisms, i.e. when do firms prefer to use 
leverage or corporate block ownership, the advantages and disadvantages of these methods and 
the optimal agency solution combinations.  
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Table 1 
Distribution of Corporate Block Sample 
 
The sample consists of U.S. publics firms that have corporate block ownership established via 
equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-2009 from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Database. I impose the following screening criteria: (1) Both parents/acquirers 
and subsidiaries/targets are U.S. public firms (2) Both parents/acquirers and subsidiaries/targets 
are not financial or utility firms. (3) Both parents/acquirers and subsidiaries/targets have at least 2 
years of financial data in Compustat and ownership data in SEC/Thomson after block formation. 
The full sample consists of 129 firms that are involved in equity carveouts and 111 firms that are 
involved in partial acquisitions for a total of 1,311 firm-year observations. 
 
Event/Year Equity Carveouts Partial Acquisitions 
1989 10 5 
1990 12 6 
1991 11 6 
1992 8 8 
1993 10 10 
1994 9 11 
1995 12 7 
1996 11 9 
1997 12 7 
1998 13 7 
1999 9 12 
2000 9 8 
2001 4 3 
2002 2 2 
2003 2 2 
2005 1 5 
2008 1 2 
2009 3 1 
Total 129 111 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Corporate Block Ownership  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for firms with corporate block ownership established via 
equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-2009. Corporate block ownership, 
insider ownership and institutional block ownership are hand-collected from proxy statements in 
SEC (for period after 1996) and Thomson One (for period before 1996). Total institutional 
ownership and ownership concentration are from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings. 
Block ownership is ownership more than 5% of shares outstanding. Board is an indicator, equal 1 
if corporate blockholders have board representation on the target firms. Product is an indicator, 
equal 1 if corporate blockholders have a business relationship or strategic alliance with target 
firms. 
 
 
Panel A: Ownership Structure in Corporate Block Full Sample 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
Corporate Block Ownership 1311 0.32 0.21 0.29 
Insider Ownership 1311 0.18 0.11 0.20 
Institutional Block Ownership 1311 0.12 0.07 0.14 
Total Institutional Ownership 1195 0.35 0.26 0.29 
Ownership Concentration - 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
1103 0.24 0.14 0.26 
 
 
 
Panel B: Ownership Structure in Equity Carveouts 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
 
Corporate Ownership 667 0.48 0.58 0.25  
Unit's Inst. Ownership 585 0.27 0.19 0.26  
Parent's Inst. Ownership 572 0.38 0.41 0.27 
 
Unit’s Ownership 
Concentration HHI Index 517 
0.29 0.16 0.28  
Parent's Ownership 
Concentration HHI Index 480 
0.19 0.09 0.24 
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Panel C: Ownership Structure in Partial Acquisitions 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
 
Corporate Ownership 644 0.17 0.15 0.13  
Target's Inst. Ownership 610 0.32 0.31 0.25  
Acquirer's Inst. Ownership 596 0.53 0.53 0.20  
Target's Ownership 
Concentration HHI Index 586 0.23 0.14 0.25 
 
Acquirer's Ownership 
Concentration HHI Index 529 0.08 0.03 0.14  
 
 
 
Panel D: Duration of Corporate Block Ownership 
 
Event N Mean Median Std Dev 
Carveouts 129 4.39 4 1.87 
Partial Acquisitions 111 4.54 4 2.08 
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Panel E: Board Representation and Product Market Relationship 
 
 
Board 
Partial 
Acquisitions 
Equity 
Carveouts 
Total 
0 418 86 
504 
(39%) 
1 214 568 
782 
(61%) 
Total 632 654 1286 
 
 
 
  Board Proportion     
Type N Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Partial 
Acquisitions 
632 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.61 
Equity Carveouts 654 0.41 0.33 0.00 0.88 
Full Sample 1286 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.88 
 
 
 
Product 
Market 
Partial Acquisitions Equity Carveouts Total 
0 298 240 
538  
(41%) 
1 346 427 
772  
(59%) 
Total 644 667 1311 
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Table 3 
The Evolution of Corporate Block Ownership 
 
This table presents ownership statistics for firms with corporate block ownership established via 
equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-2009. Corporate block ownership 
data for the following 2-10 years after block formation is hand-collected from proxy statements in 
Edgar-SEC for the years after 1996 and Thomson One for the years before 1996. 
 
 
Year after 
Event 
N Mean Median Std Dev 
1 143 0.43 0.45 0.27 
2 149 0.39 0.36 0.27 
3 146 0.36 0.29 0.28 
4 142 0.33 0.23 0.28 
5 138 0.29 0.20 0.29 
6 135 0.18 0.08 0.24 
7 116 0.15 0.00 0.23 
8 109 0.13 0.00 0.23 
9 109 0.11 0.00 0.21 
10 109 0.10 0.00 0.21 
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Table 4 
Firm Characteristics in Corporate Block Sample 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for firms with corporate block ownership established via 
equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-2009. All accounting data is from 
Compustat. Variable description is included in Appendix A. The last column, t-test difference, 
shows the tests for differences between characteristics of firm with corporate blocks and their peers 
in the same industry. 
 
Panel A: Firms with Corporate Blocks 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum t-test 
difference 
Total Assets (mil) 1311 1,777.31 118.03 8,064.99 2.44 63,078.00  *** 
Firm Size  
ln (assets) 
1311 4.93 4.77 2.04 0.89 11.05   
Book Leverage 1311 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.99 *** 
Market Leverage 1301 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.00 1.00 *** 
Cash Ratio 1311 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.88 ** 
Market-to-book 1311 2.49 1.65 3.01 0.43 12.10   
Tangibility 1311 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.87   
CAPEX 1284 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.67   
R&D 857 0.16 0.08 0.25 0.01 0.88 *** 
Profitability 1311 0.03 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.74 
 
 
 
Panel B: Other Firms in the Same Industry (2-digit SIC) 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Total Assets 106754 2,226.60 84.9 14,383.83 1 797,769.00 
Firm Size 108065 4.66 4.45 2.33 0 13.59 
Book Leverage 106754 0.21 0.16 0.21 0 1 
Market Leverage 106754 0.20 0.12 0.23 0 1 
Cash Ratio 102091 0.15 0.07 0.19 0 1 
Market-to-book 106548 2.51 1.54 4.74 0.01 52.57 
Tangibility 106625 0.27 0.19 0.24 0 1 
CAPEX 104946 0.07 0.04 0.15 0 0.87 
R&D 66177 0.13 0.06 0.25 0 0.97 
Profitability 106024 0.04 0.09 0.45 -0.13 0.87 
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Panel C:  
Pre-Block Firm Characteristics for Firms with Corporate Blocks Formed by Partial Acquisitions 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Total Assets 412 870.88 46.44 4,637.82 0.35 38,899.01 
Firm Size 412 3.99 3.84 1.96 0.58 10.45 
Book Leverage 412 0.22 0.16 0.25 0 0.95 
Market Leverage 363 0.19 0.14 0.2 0 0.88 
Market-to-book 363 2.67 1.89 2.38 0.43 25.27 
Tangibility 412 0.23 0.16 0.2 0.01 0.93 
Cash Ratio 391 0.22 0.14 0.23 0 0.99 
CAPEX 403 0.07 0.05 0.07 0 0.43 
R&D 313 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.01 0.79 
Profitability 410 0.02 0.05 0.39 0.00 0.75 
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Table 5 
Leverage of Firms based on Quartile Ranking in Corporate Block Ownership 
 
This table reports the market leverage and book leverage of firms based on ranking in corporate 
block ownership. First quartile includes firms with lowest corporate block ownership in the first 
year after their block formation, and fourth quartile with highest corporate block ownership.  
Corporate block ownership data is hand-collected from proxy statements in Edgar-SEC for the 
years after 1996 and Thomson One for the years before 1996. The sample period is 1989-2009. 
 
 
Corporate Block 
Ownership 
N Mean 
Market Leverage 
Median 
Leverage 
Minimum 
Leverage 
Maximum 
Leverage 
Q1 (Lowest ownership) 70      0.185  0.125 0            
0.856  
Q2 59      0.163  0.111 0            
0.790  
Q3 61      0.157  0.062 0            
0.653  
Q4 (Highest Ownership) 50      0.140  0.056 0            
0.717  
 
 
 
Corporate Block 
Ownership 
N Mean 
Book Leverage 
Median 
Leverage 
Minimum 
Leverage 
Maximum 
Leverage 
Q1 (Lowest ownership) 70 0.197 0.192 0 0.848 
Q2 59 0.189 0.135 0 0.687 
Q3 61 0.173 0.114 0 0.611 
Q4 (Highest Ownership) 50 0.147 0.091 0 0.573 
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Table 6 
Corporate Blockholder Ownership and Leverage 
This table presents regression results on firm market leverage for a sample of firms with corporate 
blocks formed via equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-2009. The 
regression is as follows: 
Target firm’s Leverage it = α + β1 Corporate Block Ownership i,t-1 + β2 Industry Median Leverage 
i,t-1  + β3Market-to-Book i,t-1  + β4 Profitability i,t-1 + β5 Firm Size i,t-1  + β6Tangibility i,t-1   + 
β7Inflation i,t-1 + β8Corporate blockholders’ leverage i,t-1 +  Є (1) 
  
 
Panel A: OLS and Fixed-Effects Regressions 
 
Variables (1) (2) 
Corporate Block Ownership -0.1335*** -0.146*** 
  (0.0167) (0.0290) 
Industry Med Leverage 0.657*** 0.504*** 
  (0.0611) (0.106) 
Market-to-book -0.0103** -0.00498*** 
  (0.00468) (0.00141) 
Profitability -0.0365 -0.0446*** 
  (0.0231) (0.0164) 
Firm Size 0.0111*** 0.0470*** 
  (0.00300) (0.00696) 
Tangibility 0.171*** 0.415*** 
  (0.0289) (0.0472) 
Inflation 0.162*** 0.115*** 
  (0.0448) (0.014) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.250*** 0.117*** 
  (0.0338) (0.0307) 
Constant -0.0649** -0.145** 
  (0.0256) (0.0584) 
Observations 1,274 1,274 
R-squared 0.364 0.728 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Panel B: Dynamic GMM Regression 
 
Variables GMM 
Lagged Leverage 0.342*** 
  (0.0409) 
Corporate Block Ownership -0.130*** 
  (0.0361) 
Industry Med Leverage 0.563*** 
  (0.108) 
Market-to-book -0.00280** 
  (0.00135) 
Profitability -0.0458*** 
  (0.0178) 
Firm Size 0.0646*** 
  (0.00913) 
Tangibility 0.385*** 
  (0.0561) 
Inflation 0.605 
  (1.085) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.195*** 
  (0.0343) 
Constant -0.423*** 
  (0.0684) 
Observations 991 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
 
Panel C:  
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Table 7 
Corporate Block Ownership, Leverage and Board Representation 
 
This table shows the regression results on firm leverage that have corporate blocks established 
during the period 1989-2009. Data on board representation is hand-collected from proxy 
statements. Board representation in Panel A is a dummy variable to indicate whether corporate 
blockholders have directors on target firms’ board. Board proportion in Panel B is measured as 
the number of directors nominated by corporate blockholders divided by total number of directors 
on boards. 
Panel A 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate block ownership -0.0385*** -0.0391** 
  (0.0117) (0.0186) 
board*corp.block -0.360*** -0.401*** 
  (0.0957) (0.108) 
Board -0.0409** -0.0486* 
  (0.0189) (0.0285) 
Industry Med Lev 0.663*** 0.517*** 
  (0.0615) (0.107) 
Market-to-book -0.00989** -0.00487*** 
  (0.00463) (0.00142) 
Profitability -0.0213 -0.0437*** 
  (0.0222) (0.0164) 
Firm Size 0.00725** 0.0485*** 
  (0.00322) (0.00700) 
Tangibility 0.188*** 0.423*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0475) 
Inflation 0.078* 0.055 
  (0.043) (0.042) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.248*** 0.129*** 
  (0.0338) (0.0312) 
Constant 0.0506 -0.165*** 
  (0.0391) (0.0594) 
Observations 1,261 1,261 
R-squared 0.382 0.729 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Panel B 
 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate block ownership -0.0671* -0.157*** 
  (0.0384) (0.0521) 
Board proportion*corp.block -0.351*** -0.232* 
  (0.0871) (0.137) 
Board Proportion -0.282*** -0.0422 
  (0.0608) (0.0785) 
Industry Med Lev 0.628*** 0.522*** 
  (0.0654) (0.109) 
Market-to-book -0.00958** -0.00495*** 
  (0.00459) (0.00142) 
Profitability -0.0261 -0.0400** 
  (0.0230) (0.0164) 
Firm Size 0.00856*** 0.0468*** 
  (0.00320) (0.00700) 
Tangibility 0.193*** 0.414*** 
  (0.0293) (0.0483) 
Inflation 0.037*** 0.0913* 
  (0.014) (0.049) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.247*** 0.133*** 
  (0.0346) (0.0330) 
Constant 0.0388 -0.168*** 
  (0.0405) (0.0604) 
Observations 1,261 1,261 
R-squared 0.392 0.734 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 8 
Corporate Block Ownership, Leverage, and Agency Costs 
 
This table explores how the relationship between leverage and corporate block ownership is 
affected by agency costs. Column 1 to 4 uses the first to the fourth measure of agency costs 
respectively as defined in Appendix A.  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corporate Block Ownership -0.143*** -0.121*** -0.106*** -0.111*** 
  (0.0376) (0.0294) (0.0291) (0.0291) 
C.own#Agency1 -0.0168**       
  (0.00848)       
Agency Costs 1 -0.0277*       
  (0.0168)       
C.own#Agency2   -0.00205***     
    (0.000355)     
Agency Costs 2   -0.000226     
    (0.00104)     
C.own#Agency3     -0.0901*   
      (0.0510)   
Agency Costs 3     -0.0579   
      (0.145)   
C.own#Agency4       -0.0920*** 
        (0.0394) 
Agency Costs 4       -0.00848 
        (0.0757) 
Industry Med Lev 0.499*** 0.497*** 0.507*** 0.512*** 
  (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) 
Profitability -0.0470*** -0.0497*** -0.0444*** -0.0464*** 
  (0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Firm Size 0.0502*** 0.0455*** 0.0469*** 0.0470*** 
  (0.00727) (0.00721) (0.00697) (0.00696) 
Tangibility 0.414*** 0.395*** 0.414*** 0.410*** 
  (0.0470) (0.0484) (0.0472) (0.0472) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,160 1,140 1,173 1,173 
R-squared 0.732 0.733 0.728 0.729 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 9 
Corporate Blocks, Leverage, and Product Market Relationship 
 
This table presents regression analysis of firm leverage on product market relationship and its 
interaction with corporate block ownership. A product market relationship with corporate 
blockholders is defined when firms disclose it in their proxy statements or the equity block 
establishment is announced on Factiva news along with strategic business transactions, alliances, 
or product agreements. Vertical in panel B is a dummy variable to indicate whether corporate 
blockholders have a vertical business relationship with target firms. 
 
Panel A 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE (3) OLS (4) FE 
Corporate block -0.1195*** -0.1455*** -0.1279*** -0.1465*** 
  (0.0339) (0.0423) (0.0344) (0.0424) 
Product*corp.block -0.0376 -0.0879 -0.0516 -0.0841 
  (0.0377) (0.0570) (0.0395) (0.0580) 
Product Market -0.0291** -0.00991 -0.0434*** -0.00700 
  (0.0148) (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0185) 
Industry Med Lev 0.651*** 0.517*** 0.653*** 0.518*** 
  (0.0613) (0.107) (0.0613) (0.107) 
Market-to-book -0.00982** -0.00481*** -0.00966** -0.00485*** 
  (0.00445) (0.00142) (0.00438) (0.00142) 
Profitability -0.0275 -0.0451*** -0.0261 -0.0457*** 
  (0.0226) (0.0163) (0.0231) (0.0164) 
Firm Size 0.00821*** 0.0467*** 0.00820*** 0.0469*** 
  (0.00316) (0.00697) (0.00316) (0.00699) 
Tangibility 0.188*** 0.402*** 0.188*** 0.402*** 
  (0.0278) (0.0481) (0.0278) (0.0481) 
Inflation 0.035 0.758 0.026 0.777 
  (0.923) (1.041) (0.926) (1.043) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.243*** 0.117*** 0.198*** 0.128*** 
  (0.0342) (0.0307) (0.0484) (0.0431) 
Product*blockholders' lev     0.0905** 0.0889* 
      (0.0405) (0.0511) 
Constant 0.0678* -0.146** 0.0767** -0.149** 
  (0.0381) (0.0584) (0.0382) (0.0589) 
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 
R-squared 0.383 0.722 0.384 0.724 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 9 
Panel B 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate block -0.0939*** -0.0865*** 
  (0.0193) (0.0311) 
Vertical*corp.block -0.119 -0.100 
  (0.9533) (0.0858) 
Vertical Relationship -0.0578* -0.0194 
  (0.0311) (0.0319) 
Industry Med Lev 0.645*** 0.511*** 
  (0.0621) (0.106) 
Market-to-book -0.00991** -0.00490*** 
  (0.00461) (0.00141) 
Profitability -0.0233 -0.0454*** 
  (0.0230) (0.0164) 
Firm Size 0.00806** 0.0476*** 
  (0.00322) (0.00696) 
Tangibility 0.187*** 0.414*** 
  (0.0293) (0.0473) 
Inflation 0.959 0.919 
  (0.940) (1.020) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.255*** 0.115*** 
  (0.0342) (0.0307) 
Constant 0.0487 -0.151** 
  (0.0393) (0.0585) 
Observations 1,173 1,173 
R-squared 0.378 0.727 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 
Corporate Block Ownership and Institutional Ownership 
 
This table presents regression results on firms’ institutional ownership for a sample of firms that 
have corporate blocks formed via equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-
2009. Data on institutional ownership is from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings. The 
regression is as follows: 
 
Target Firm’s Institutional Ownership it = α + β1 Corporate Block Ownershipi,t-1 + β2 Firm Size i,t-
1  + β3 Market-to-Book i,t-1  +β4 Profitability i,t-1 + Є 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate Blocks -0.417*** -0.366*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0409) 
Firm Size 0.0787*** 0.0936*** 
 (0.00414) (0.0101) 
Market-to-book 0.0122*** 0.00759* 
 (0.00427) (0.00399) 
Profitability 0.0751** -0.00932 
 (0.0355) (0.0188) 
Constant 0.0489* -0.0320 
 (0.0279) (0.0595) 
Observations 902 902 
R-squared 0.498 0.652 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 11 
Corporate Blocks, Institutional Ownership, and Product Market Relationship 
 
This table presents regression analysis on firms’ institutional ownership on product market 
relationship and its interaction with corporate block ownership. The dependent variable is firms’ 
institutional ownership. Product is an indicator, equal 1 if corporate blockholders have some 
product market relationship or strategic alliances with target firms. 
 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Product 0.0528*** 0.0672*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0236) 
Corporate Blocks  -0.087***  -0.0844*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0430) 
Product*Corp. Blocks 0.0293 0.0123 
 (0.0524) (0.0934) 
Firm Size 0.0782*** 0.0815*** 
 (0.00404) (0.00987) 
Market-to-book 0.00370 0.00284* 
 (0.00273) (0.00159) 
Profitability 0.0708** 0.0117 
 (0.0360) (0.0203) 
Constant 0.0761** 0.0683 
 (0.0295) (0.0572) 
Observations 845 845 
R-squared 0.519 0.659 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 12 
Corporate Ownership, Institutional Ownership and Leverage 
 
This table presents regression results on firm leverage for a sample of firms that have corporate 
blocks formed via equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-2009. It repeats 
the regression (1) in Table 6 to include institutional ownership and ownership concentration. 
Data on institutional ownership is from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings. 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate block -0.0693** -0.140*** 
  (0.0277) (0.0435) 
Institutional Ownership -0.0982*** -0.0476 
  (0.0338) (0.0370) 
Industry Med Lev 0.635*** 0.468*** 
  (0.0783) (0.149) 
Market-to-book -0.00718* -0.00380** 
  (0.00386) (0.00150) 
Profitability 0.00320 -0.0467** 
  (0.0222) (0.0193) 
Firm Size 0.0211*** 0.0446*** 
  (0.00491) (0.00989) 
Tangibility 0.171*** 0.357*** 
  (0.0356) (0.0663) 
Inflation 0.958*** 0.408** 
  (0.126) (0.208) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.292*** 0.146*** 
  (0.0371) (0.0375) 
Constant 0.0314 -0.0510 
  (0.0437) (0.0779) 
Observations 935 935 
R-squared 0.405 0.753 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Table 13 
Robustness Check on Equity Carveouts with Minority Stake Held by Parent Firms 
 
This table repeats the regressions on firm leverage and institutional ownership in a sub-sample of 
equity carveouts with less than 50% ownership held by parent firms.  
 
  
Panel A:  
Regression on Target Firm leverage 
 Panel B:  
Regression on Target Firms’ Institutional 
Ownership 
 
VARIABLES (1) FE 
Block Ownership -0.912* 
 (0.507) 
Parent's Book Leverage 0.354*** 
 (0.0921) 
Industry Median Leverage 0.413* 
 (0.220) 
Market-to-book -0.0364*** 
 (0.0103) 
Profitability -0.225*** 
 (0.0788) 
Firm Size 0.0323*** 
 (0.0111) 
Tangibility 0.0222 
 (0.0971) 
Constant 0.380 
 (0.237) 
Observations 136 
R-squared 0.560 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
VARIABLES (1) FE 
Parent Block Ownership -0.697*** 
 (0.126) 
Firm Size 0.0725** 
 (0.0315) 
Market-to-book 0.00234 
 (0.0131) 
Profitability -0.0524 
 (0.0906) 
Constant 0.216 
 (0.192) 
  
Observations 165 
R-squared 0.661 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definition 
• Book leverage is measured as debt in current liabilities (DLC) plus total long-term debt 
(DLTT) divided by total assets (AT).  
• Market Leverage it = 
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇+𝐷𝐿𝐶
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇+𝐷𝐿𝐶+(𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶∗𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂)
 
where DLTT is the amount of long-term debt, DLC is debt in current liabilities, including the 
portion of long-term debt due within one year, PRCC is the year-end common share price, and 
CSHO is the year-end number of common shares outstanding.  
• Market-to-Book is computed as: 
𝑀/𝐵𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡− 𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡+(𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡∗𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑖𝑡)+ 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐿𝑖𝑡 
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
where AT is total assets, SEQ is book equity, TXDITC is deferred tax, PRCC is the year-end 
common share price, CSHO is the year-end number of common shares outstanding, and PSTKL is 
liquidation value of preferred stock.  
• Profitability is operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) over total assets. 
• Tangibility is fixed assets (PPENT) over total assets. 
• Cash Ratio is cash and short-term investments (CH) over total assets. 
• Firm size is the natural log of total assets.  
• Board: equal 1 if corporate blockholders assign directors or have same directors on the 
target firms’ boards, and 0 otherwise. 
• Product: equal 1 if corporate blockholders have a product market relationship with target 
firms, and 0 otherwise. 
• Vertical: equal 1 if corporate blockholders have a vertical relationship with target firms, 
and 0 otherwise. 
• Agency1 is the first measure of agency costs calculated by total assets over sales. 
• Agency2 is the second measure of agency costs calculated by operating expenses over sales. 
• Agency3 is the third measure of agency costs, a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
a firm is large and has few growth opportunities (i.e., market capitalization greater than the 
80th percentile and market-to-book ratio less than the 20th percentile in a given calendar 
year). 
• Agency4 is the fourth measure of agency costs, a dummy variable taking the value of one 
for firms with managers that tend to overspend on Selling, General and Administrative 
(SG&A) costs without legitimate economic reasons (i.e., SG&A expenses greater than the 
80th percentile and sales growth less than the 20th percentile in a given calendar year). 
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Appendix B 
Subsample Results on Corporate Blockholders and Leverage 
This table presents regression results of corporate block ownership on target firms’ leverage 
separately for sub-samples of equity carveouts and partial acquisitions for the period 1989-2009.  
 
Panel A: Equity Carveouts 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Parent Block Ownership -0.0996*** -0.115*** 
  (0.0267) (0.0337) 
Industry Med Leverage 0.674*** 0.494*** 
  (0.0833) (0.126) 
Market-to-book -0.0192*** -0.0150*** 
  (0.00480) (0.00345) 
Profitability -0.142*** -0.129*** 
  (0.0367) (0.0400) 
Firm Size 0.0113** 0.0509*** 
  (0.00502) (0.0122) 
Tangibility 0.123*** 0.459*** 
  (0.0371) (0.0788) 
Inflation 0.963*** 0.574* 
  (0.1482) (0.324) 
Parents' Leverage 0.294*** 0.112*** 
  (0.0441) (0.0420) 
Constant 0.217*** -0.128 
  (0.0580) (0.101) 
Observations 653 653 
R-squared 0.435 0.755 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Panel B: Partial Acquisitions 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate Block Ownership -0.105* -0.1571** 
  (0.0605) (0.0721) 
Industry Med Leverage 0.508*** 0.513** 
  (0.0875) (0.217) 
Market-to-book -0.00525 -0.00247* 
  (0.00349) (0.00146) 
Profitability -0.00931 -0.0218 
  (0.0160) (0.0173) 
Firm Size 0.00577 0.0432*** 
  (0.00376) (0.00840) 
Tangibility 0.254*** 0.342*** 
  (0.0436) (0.0595) 
Inflation 0.478*** 0.476* 
  (0.182) (0.252) 
Acquirers' Leverage 0.161*** 0.107** 
  (0.0425) (0.0472) 
Constant 0.0373 -0.158** 
  (0.0459) (0.0761) 
Observations 621 621 
R-squared 0.377 0.767 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Appendix C 
Subsample Results on Corporate Blockholders, Board Proportion, and Leverage 
This table presents regression results of corporate block ownership and board proportion on 
target firms’ leverage separately for sub-samples of equity carveouts and partial acquisitions. 
Panel A: Equity Carve-outs 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate block -0.672*** -0.898* 
  (0.183) (0.508) 
b.proportion*corp.block -0.426** -0.800*** 
  (0.187) (0.112) 
Board Proportion -0.131*** -0.0943*** 
  (0.0357) (0.0393) 
Industry Med Lev 0.596*** 0.519*** 
  (0.0864) (0.127) 
Market-to-book -0.0195*** -0.0148*** 
  (0.00469) (0.00346) 
Profitability -0.144*** -0.130*** 
  (0.0356) (0.0402) 
Firm Size 0.0105** 0.0522*** 
  (0.00492) (0.0126) 
Tangibility 0.134*** 0.476*** 
  (0.0366) (0.0807) 
Inflation 0.142 0.318 
  (1.439) (1.560) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.305*** 0.128*** 
  (0.0436) (0.0427) 
Constant 0.175*** -0.155 
  (0.0560) (0.105) 
Observations 647 647 
R-squared 0.467 0.762 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Panel B: Partial Acquisitions 
 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE 
Corporate block -0.224** -0.1754* 
  (0.104) (0.100) 
b.proportion*corp.block -0.756*** -0.517*** 
  (0.143) (0.162) 
Board Proportion -0.0434* -0.0398 
  (0.0251) (0.0309) 
Industry Med Lev 0.511*** 0.574** 
  (0.0872) (0.223) 
Market-to-book -0.00538 -0.00250* 
  (0.00351) (0.00147) 
Profitability -0.00832 -0.0190 
  (0.0166) (0.0174) 
Firm Size 0.00572 0.0417*** 
  (0.00385) (0.00847) 
Tangibility 0.242*** 0.336*** 
  (0.0450) (0.0604) 
Inflation 0.334*** 0.211** 
  (0.171) (0.106) 
Blockholders' Leverage 0.169*** 0.115** 
  (0.0428) (0.0478) 
Constant 0.0350 -0.168** 
  (0.0460) (0.0766) 
Observations 614 614 
R-squared 0.382 0.670 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
